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Smart meters and energy displays are being rolled out in many countries to help indi-
viduals monitor and reduce their energy usage. However, to date, there is little in depth
understanding of how they may change behavior. While there is currently a great deal
of technical research into developing smart metering, little research has been conducted
on how this affects the energy user. This research addresses this gap and explores the
user perspective of energy displays when energy is considered as a shared resource. We
report an online experiment conducted across the UK examining affective and behavioral
responses to energy sharing situations incorporating different types of energy displays.
Reactions differed depending on the type of display. In a situation where one person used
more than their fair share of energy, displays showing the average amount of usage in the
house were associated with feelings of guilt and fear and a decrease in intention to use
energy. Displays that identified the person who overused the resource were associated
with anger, and direct sanction intentions on those who were overusing energy. Findings
are discussed in terms of the smart meter rollout and the potential utility of detailed energy
monitoring technologies for behavior change.
Keywords: energy displays, energy behavior, free-riding, social behavior, emotions
INTRODUCTION
Reducing energy consumption in buildings is a key way to help
reduce carbon emissions. Between 2009 and 2010, for example,
it was estimated that carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the UK
increased by 3.8% (DECC, 2011). In particular, CO2 emissions
from the residential sector increased by 13.4% and domestic elec-
tricity consumption increased by almost 27% by 2010 compared
to 1990 (DECC, 2011). Furthermore, energy use in buildings
accounts for a large proportion of carbon emitted (e.g., in the UK,
emissions from buildings accounted for 37% of total UK green-
house gas emissions in 2012) (CCC, 2013). Of this, non-residential
buildings account for 34% (CCC, 2013) and are now a target
for national and international legislation on carbon reduction.
In 2012, emissions from public and commercial buildings have
increased of almost 10%. People’s behavior in buildings is crucial
in determining energy use, often accounting for large variations
in energy consumption across buildings with similar characteris-
tics (Janda, 2011). The UK government has committed to rolling
out smart meters and energy displays to all UK households and
small businesses by 2020 (DECC, 2013), in part to encourage a
reduction in energy use. Smart meters and energy displays are also
being rolled out in homes and businesses in many other western
countries. The penetration rate already exceeds 70% in Italy and
Nordic countries of Europe and is expected to attain at least 50%
in the US, France, and Spain by 2016 (Berg-Insight, 2011a,b).
Energy displays (that is, little screens that show how much
energy is used in the house) are being rolled out in the UK and
most other countries commonly provide overall electricity usage
data. However, there is a growing ability to disaggregate electricity
usage (Froehlich et al., 2011) and use smart plugs (e.g., AlertMe or
eSight) to provide more detail of where and what is using electric-
ity. While this data is important for facilitating efficiency measures,
there is little evidence on how feeding back this information may
influence the user (Hutton et al., 1986; Brandon and Lewis, 1999;
Abrahamse et al., 2005). In shared houses, as well as in the work-
place, energy displays can be communal: that is, the energy used by
everyone is displayed to everyone. Given that in the UK, less than
30% of households are composed of only one person, and there
are 4.5 million private sector businesses, these circumstances are
common (Department of Communities and Local Government,
2009). Nonetheless, research so far has focused on the impact of
energy displays on the individual and not on the group. We pro-
pose that the interaction between members of a group is important
in determining engagement and behavioral responses.
Simply presenting information about energy use may not be
the best way to encourage behavior change (Darby, 2006a). Fur-
thermore, in the case of communal displays, we think it is likely to
have specific consequences on affect and social behavior (Ander-
son and White, 2009). For example, seeing other people using
too much energy may make people angry and lead to conflict
(Small and Loewenstein, 2005). Also, knowing that other people
can see when you use too much energy may leave people fear-
ful of being punished or disliked (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998;
Milinski et al., 2002b; Haley and Fessler, 2005). Indeed, energy
use in the house is a matter of interaction between the occupants,
where one’s behavior is influenced by the others’ behavior and
vice-versa (e.g., cooperation behaviors around shared appliances)
(Heiskanen et al., 2010). The current research uses experimental
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scenarios to explore how people may interact around different
types of energy display and ultimately how these displays may
encourage intentions to change behavior.
Typical energy displays provide the user with direct feedback
on current total electricity consumption, with, in some cases,
cost per hour at the current rate (Darby, 2006a). Sometimes they
also provide data on current usage and previous daily or weekly
usage (Darby, 2006a). However, a growing amount of research into
energy monitoring now allows for electricity data to be collected
and displayed at a finer level (Norman, 2000; Darby, 2006a; Broms
et al., 2010; Strengers, 2011). Products range from fully integrated
smart appliances to portable plugs that can monitor individual
existing appliances (Norman,2000; Fischer,2008; Hargreaves et al.,
2010). With the provision of a disaggregated feedback, it is now
increasingly possible to identify individual energy usage even in
shared spaces. More detailed displays of energy use are expected to
increase consumers’ engagement and lower their usage. Although,
it is possible that too much complexity could decrease the effi-
cacy of monitoring systems (see Norman, 2000; Hargreaves et al.,
2010).
Research examining engagement with an energy displays found
that the displays can reduce an individual’s energy use between 5
and 15% (Darby, 2006b; Faruqui et al., 2010). A more recent review
has found a range between 0 and 11% depending on the type of
fuel and consumer group, with a mean of 3% (Ofgem, 2011, Raw
and Ross, 2011). Nonetheless, little is known on the potential mod-
erating effect of the type of displays on their efficacy and when the
information is shared by a group rather than just presented to
an individual (Hargreaves et al., 2013). Froehlich (2009) lists 10
display variables that could affect the utility of energy displays.
Of particular relevance, here is the social comparison of energy
use (e.g., you are using more than person X) and social sharing
of energy use (e.g., on social networking sites) that are important
for communal situations. According to Froehlich (2009), sharing
one’s energy use with others may increase accountability and pres-
sure to be energy efficient, whereas social comparisons might be
counterproductive. There is currently, to our knowledge, no evi-
dence linking people’s interactions around energy displays and
their behavior changes in energy use. However, research in psy-
chology on cooperation and the broader environmental literature
has addressed these issues of knowing about other people’s behav-
iors and how this can influence one’s own behaviors. Within the
broader environmental psychology literature, the positive influ-
ence of social or group norms on behavior is often noted (Cialdini
et al., 1991; Cialdini,2003; Thogersen,2006). People are more likely
to undertake sustainable behavior when encouraged by peers and
when this behavior is visible to peers (Cialdini, 2003). For this
reason, interaction and communication between people around
energy may have benefits in encouraging energy conservation: if
an individual can see others reducing their energy use, then they
are more likely to do the same (Olli et al., 2001; Schultz et al.,
2007; Heiskanen et al., 2010). Energy use feedback that illustrates
energy conservation by others may therefore be particularly useful
in encouraging others to do the same. However, this may not always
be the case: research comparing energy use between households
has found that this can be unpopular (IEA, 2005) or inefficient
(Harries et al., Forthcomming). Furthermore, people who already
have a low consumption and a higher comparator level may actu-
ally increase their usage as a result (Brandon and Lewis, 1999;
Fischer, 2008).
Energy sharing contexts (e.g., in a shared house or workplace)
can imply cooperation around energy resources and thus, can add
a further layer of complexity to these kinds of social influences. It
is common that while energy is shared between users, the cost of
this resource is often split equally or allocated on the basis of some
other indicator (e.g., floor space). In such a context where several
users are interacting, divergent motivations exist, where individ-
ual and social benefits differ for people to contribute less to, or
to take more from the common good than others (Dawes, 1980;
Komorita and Parks, 1995; Weber et al., 2004; Biel and Thogersen,
2007; Carlsson-Kanyama and Lindén, 2007). At a macro (world)
level, energy resources can be thought of as a resource dilemma,
where everyone takes from the common resource – energy – but it
will be depleted if everyone takes too much too quickly (Komorita
and Parks, 1995). At a micro, individual level, however, energy is
usually not perceived as finite and use by one individual does not
reduce availability to others. However, it may raise costs. Indeed,
if people decide to share the costs equally, collective interests are
to limit one’s use of energy to one’s fair share of it, whereas indi-
vidual interests are to use more than one’s share and free-ride
(Dawes, 1980; Balliet et al., 2011). Free-riding in this case is to use
more energy than others, while still paying the same costs as oth-
ers. Energy use in a shared situation, where costs are not charged
on the basis of actual use, can therefore be considered a social
dilemma (Dawes, 1980; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009). Impor-
tantly, a lack of cooperation is often felt as a barrier to conserving
energy (EPRI, 2011) and individuals are likely to feel discouraged
in their sustainability efforts if they feel like they are the only ones
contributing (cf. the “drop in the ocean” feeling; Lorenzoni et al.,
2007).
Indeed, evidence from behavioral economics and psychology
shows that people often free-ride when resources are shared (Mar-
well and Ames, 1979; Dawes, 1980; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
A way to overcome free-riding effects is to give individuals an
opportunity to monitor each other’s behavior by making actions
more visible (Milinski et al., 2002a; Bateson et al., 2006; Hardy
and Van Vugt, 2006; Iredale et al., 2008; Engel, 2011). Coopera-
tion decreases as group size and anonymity increase (Hamburger
et al., 1975) and conversely being able to identify or be identi-
fied as a free-rider can increase cooperation (Haley and Fessler,
2005) as it reassures individuals of fairness. Using more detailed
displays of energy use provides an opportunity for people to mon-
itor each other to maintain an optimal level in energy expenditure,
potentially reducing overall energy use.
Strong reciprocity theory (SRT) predicts that people will rein-
force fair, and punish unfair, behavior even if it implies sacrifice
for themselves, in the hope that others will stop free-riding in the
future (Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002; Gächter and Herrmann,
2009). Research has shown that individuals are willing to pay a
cost (financial) to punish free-riders and that this use of punish-
ment indeed increases cooperation levels (Fehr and Gächter, 2002;
Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). While such altruistic punishment
behavior is reliably observed in the laboratory, criticisms of the
SRT model are whether financial sanctions are applicable to real
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world dilemmas (Guala, 2012). In a “real world” situation, other
types of high cost punishment are possible: for example, a direct
confrontation comes at a high individual cost as one puts oneself in
an uncomfortable situation. In fact,people have a range of sanction
options and reactions: gossip and reputation damaging actions,
institutionalized sanctions (police, taxes, etc.) (Balliet et al., 2011).
The critics of the SRT have suggested that people might prefer
indirect organizational sanctions over direct and costly personal
sanctions (Guala, 2012). We suggest, it is important to consider
ecologically valid reactions to a shared energy resource situation,
where people can directly or indirectly sanction an individual for
their uncooperative actions.
In addition, people’s emotional response to a non-cooperative
situation may be a useful indicator of their likely reactions, both
toward the free-rider and with regards to their own future behav-
ior. Indeed, SRT highlights negative emotions toward a free-rider
as one potential explanation for altruistic punishment responses
(Fehr and Gächter, 2002). In the context of non-cooperation
around energy use, potential emotional reactions could include
anger or sadness, or even guilt, depending on how people inter-
pret the situation and particularly how they perceive their coping
possibilities (Scherer, 1997). For example, an individual may antic-
ipate being accused of overusing energy and feel guilty even if they
are not the individual who did overuse. Such emotional reactions
were previously associated with different behavioral responses. For
example,anger is linked with approach tendencies and, therefore, it
may encourage people to confront the free-rider, whereas sadness
and fear are characterized as avoidance emotions, and are more
likely to deter people from confrontation (Carver, 2001; Carver
and Harmon-Jones, 2009). Indeed, some evidence indicates that
situations perceived as unfair trigger feelings of anger (Pillutla
and Murnighan, 1996; Tabibnia et al., 2008), and in turn that
anger is indeed associated with punishment of free-riders (Fehr
and Gächter, 2002). Furthermore, in the context of energy sharing
if people are not sure of how much energy they used themselves
they may feel negative emotions such as fear or guilt, and are likely
to reduce how much energy they will subsequently use (Elgaaied,
2012).
In the current study, we investigated, using scenarios, people’s
reactions to energy sharing and how this was affected by informa-
tion fed back on different types of energy display. We wanted to
establish whether increasing the detail of information provided on
the displays would affect people’s cooperation intentions around
energy. Given previous research suggesting that the more anony-
mous the energy display is, the less people cooperate (Schuessler,
1989), we predicted that (1) with energy displays that provide less
detailed information about individual energy use, people would
be likely to intend to use more than their fair share of energy.
Also, we hypothesized that (2) the type of energy displays viewed
would affect some emotional reaction: in a situation where the
display does not give enough information to identify the free-
rider, people are likely to feel less angry toward the free-rider than
if the display provides clear evidence that one person free rode.
Finally, we expected that (3) the less information provided on an
energy display, the less information people have on a potential
free-rider, and therefore, the less likely they would want to punish
a free-rider.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
DESIGN
We employed an experimental design using a series of scenar-
ios in a large-scale survey to simulate different situations where
electricity is shared between several people. We chose a common
scenario in the UK: a situation in which the individual shares
a house with other people and in which the cost of electricity
is divided equally regardless of use. In each scenario, they have
access to an energy display that provides information on either
the overall electricity used by the house (average), similar to cur-
rent displays being rolled out, or information on electricity used
per individual, where individuals are either named (named) or
kept anonymous (anonymous). These alternative displays were
considered because they correspond to the current technological
developments into finer grained monitoring of energy use, and
represent a continuum of privacy. Half of all scenarios described a
cooperative situation where people each used a similar amount of
electricity (control). The other half described a non-cooperative
situation where one person used more than their fair share of
energy (free-riding). We measured emotional reactions to the situ-
ation,preferences for sanctions toward other users, and subsequent
behavioral intentions for energy use.
PROCEDURE
Participants were recruited via email advertisements sent to staff
and postgraduate students in a range of departments of 28 uni-
versities across the United Kingdom (three departments declined
to send the advertisement to their mailing list). We gained a final
sample of 519, including 324 women and 195 men (M age= 33.31,
SD= 10.03). We obtained informed consent from all our par-
ticipants. As a compensation for participation, email addresses
were entered in a prize draw to win £50 in shopping vouchers.
The study was run on Qualtrics Software. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 (situation: control
vs. free-riding)× 3 (display: average vs. named vs. anonymous)
between participants design. Participants first had to read a sce-
nario describing a situation where they share the cost of domestic
energy and where either one person uses more than their fair
share (free-riding) or all use an equal amount (control). Within
the scenarios, they were also shown one of three types of energy
usage displays that, to varying degree, could identify who were
free-riding. They then had to answer a series of questions about
their understanding of the scenarios, their reactions to this situa-
tion, and how much energy they are likely to use in the future (see
Ferguson et al., 2012 for a similar methodology). At the end of
the questionnaire, participants were directed to a webpage that
debriefed them on the procedure and aims of the study. The
procedure and material of the present study were approved by
the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, University of
Nottingham, UK.
MATERIALS
Scenarios and displays
All scenarios depicted a situation where the participant shared a
house with three other people, he/she did not know before they
moved in (a common situation in the UK). The average electricity
use of the house was the same in all scenarios and the scenarios
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explained that the monthly bill was split equally (£20 each). In the
control situation, the electricity bill showed that the same amount
of electricity as the previous month was used and the bill was split
fairly (£20 each). In the free-riding situation, more energy than
average was used in the current month compared to the previous
month, despite the efforts of the participant, so the display showed
that one or more people had used more than their fair share of
electricity over this period and the equally divided electricity costs
were therefore unfair (£35 pounds).
Scenarios explained that the house was equipped with an energy
monitor and display and the type of display differed between
scenarios. In the average display conditions, the energy moni-
tor placed in the house showed how much electricity was used
in total in the whole house, so people could not see how much
each housemate was using. In the anonymous display conditions,
the energy monitor showed each individual’s usage, but the dis-
play was anonymized; that is, each name was replaced by a letter:
A, B, C, or D, so participants did not know who was overus-
ing or not, but were aware whether it was one or more people.
In the named display conditions, the energy monitor showed
each individual’s usage, providing their name under each amount
(Figure 1).
Questionnaire
Questionnaire items included demographic measures (including
gender, age, location, and socio-economic status), manipulation
checks on the scenario read (including memory and understand-
ing of the scenario), measures of reactions to the scenario pre-
sented and free-rider within the scenario, and amount of energy
planned to be used the following month.
Emotional reactions. Emotional reactions to the scenario pre-
sented were measured among all participants with seven point
Likert-type scales, which asked them to indicate their “feelings
in this situation.” In addition, in the free-riding situations, they
indicated on similar scales what their “feelings would be toward
the person who used more electricity than everyone else, if (they)
knew/know who they were/are.” Emotions examined were anger,
gratitude, guilt, happiness, irritation, shame, surprise, annoyance,
disappointment, fear, and hope. These items were selected from
the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS, Watson et al., 1988)
as representing possible reactions to free-riding and cooperation
(Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Tabibnia
et al., 2008). Note that, we did include positive reactions within the
list, primarily to examine whether these would be higher within a
cooperative situation compared to a free-riding situation.
Sanctions against free-riding. In the free-riding conditions only,
participants were also asked to rate a list of nine possible sanctions
and reactions in the situation. They were also asked to choose the
one reaction, among these nine, that they would be most likely to
use. The possible reactions were selected by a panel of four experts
including two experts in behavioral economics, and two experts in
energy research. These listed reactions that were negative toward
the free-rider (e.g., “how likely would you be to gossip to your
other housemates about them”) and some aimed at reducing the
energy bill without sanctioning the free-rider per se (e.g., “would
you investigate how much energy the different appliances in the
house use and inform your housemates about it?”), see full list
of potential reactions in Table 1. If participants wanted to add
another reaction that was most likely, they could add it to the list.
FIGURE 1 | Energy displays used in the scenarios. On the upper line are the displays in the no free-riding conditions, on the lower line the displays in the
free-riding conditions. And, from left to right on both lines: average displays, anonymous displays, and nominal displays.
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Table 1 | Percentage of preference for each reaction to free-riding,
across energy display type (N =239).
Percentage
Call a house meeting to discuss the issue 36.4
Make sure that they pay more for the past month
(proportional to the amount of electricity they have used)
24.7
Confront the person, who is using more electricity directly
and ask them to reduce their electricity use
23.0
Ask your housemates to make sure that they switch
appliances off when they are not using them
7.1
Investigate the energy use of appliances in the house and
inform your housemates about the appliances’ energy use
3.3
Other 2.9
Gossip to my housemates about the person who is using
more electricity
1.7
Choose not to do anything 0.8
Tell the landlord that this person is using more electricity 0
Ostracize the person who is using more electricity (e.g., not
helping them, not passing on messages)
0
Energy behavior. Finally, we asked participants whether they
would decrease or increase their energy use in the following
month. We used a five-point scale, with the following labels:
“decrease your electricity use by a substantial amount,” “slightly
decrease your electricity use,” “do not change your electricity use
(keep at 180 kWh),” “slightly increase your electricity use,” and
“increase your electricity use by a substantial amount.”
RESULTS
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
For analyses, here we used participant data only for those who
correctly answered manipulation check questions on understand-
ing and remembering the scenario. Twenty-one participants were
excluded from our sample leaving a final sample of 498 par-
ticipants, of which 312 were women and 186 were men, with
an age range of 20–65 (median age= 30; mean age= 33.4,
SD= 10.09). Neither the gender, age, SES, nor the concern for
energy use influenced the dependent variables nor the mech-
anisms described in the present research. Hence, they will not
be further discussed in the present paper. Eighty-two percent of
our sample had experienced sharing a house with non-family
members.
EMOTIONAL RESPONSES
To study the emotional reactions to free-riding, we conducted a
between MANOVA with scenario (2: control or free-riding) as
a fixed factor on the 11 emotional responses (anger, gratitude,
guilt, happiness, irritation, shame, surprise, annoyance, disap-
pointment, fear, and hope). The type of scenario significantly
affected measures of emotions, F(11, 486)= 217.41, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.83. Notably, between participants ANOVAs show that
in the free-riding scenario, people felt significantly less happy,
F(1, 496)= 348.99, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.41, more angry, F(1,
496)= 1263, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.72, and more fearful, F(1,
496)= 115.67, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.19, than in the control scenario
(Figure 2).
To study the effects of energy displays on people’s emotional
reactions in the situation,we conducted a 2× 3 between MANOVA
with scenario type (2: control or free-riding) and display type
(3: average, named or anonymous) as fixed factors on the 11
emotional responses. Results reveal an interaction effect between
scenario type and display type on emotional reactions, F(11,
483)= 3.38, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.07. Notably, between participants
effects reveal that people reacted with more anger to the free-
riding situation the more details, they had about the free-rider (the
less anonymous it was), F(2, 492)= 3.37, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.014.
Interestingly, participants felt more guilty and fearful in the free-
riding situation, the less details they had about the free-rider, F(2,
492)= 3.68, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.015 and F(2, 492)= 5.38, p< 0.01,
η2p = 0.021, respectively. Simple effects analyses revealed that
the type of displays affected how guilty and fearful people felt
when there was a free-rider only [F(2, 493)= 8.20, p< 0.001
and F(2, 493)= 8.99, p< 0.001, respectively]: people felt more
guilty and fearful when there was a free-rider and the energy
display was average. Finally, post hoc comparisons on feelings
of fear and guilt (using Bonferroni corrections) reveal that the
average display was significantly different from both anonymous
(p< 0.001) and named (p< 0.01) displays but that anonymous
and named displays were not significantly different from each
other (Figure 3).
REACTIONS AND SANCTIONS TOWARD THE FREE-RIDER
We also explored participants’ reactions in the free-riding situa-
tion (Table 1). The most common was to call for a house meeting;
this was chosen by 36.4% of the sample. Making sure that the free-
rider pays more for their share of electricity in the past month
(24.7%) and confronting the person directly to ask them to reduce
their electricity use (23%) was also chosen most frequently. Asking
housemates to make sure that they switch appliances off when they
are not using them was endorsed by 7.1%. Ostracizing was never
chosen as the most likely reaction, and gossiping only by 1.8% of
the sample. Interestingly, only 0.8% of the sample said that they
would not do anything.
The type of electricity display participants viewed had a mar-
ginal influence on how people were likely to react and whether they
wanted to sanction the free-rider,χ2= 23.25 p= 0.056 (Figure 4).
With the average display, people tended to be less likely to ask the
free-rider to pay more (14.8%) than if they had been provided with
information that only one person used too much energy (28.1 and
31.9% for anonymous and name displays, respectively). They were
also more likely to choose reactions that were not punishing for
the free-rider with an average display, such as asking people to
make sure that they switch off the appliances (12.3%) compared
to people who saw the anonymous or named displays (4.5 and
4.3%, respectively). Such results make intuitive sense given that
in the average display scenarios the free-rider was less able to be
identified.
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FIGURE 2 | Means of positive and negative emotions in the free-riding and the control (no free-riding) conditions.
FIGURE 3 | Effects of scenarios and display types on feelings of anger, guilt, and fear.
EFFECTS OF DISPLAY ON ENERGY USE INTENTIONS
Participants, across all conditions, on average wanted to reduce
their energy use for the following month [M use= 2.56, SD= 0.6,
t (497)=−16.37, p< 0.001; Cohen’s d = 1.47 for the difference to
the midpoint of the scale]. To study the effects of engaging with dif-
ferent energy displays within different scenarios on people’s subse-
quent energy use intentions, we conducted a 2 (scenario: control or
free-riding)× 3 (energy display: average, named or anonymous)
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FIGURE 4 | Percentage of preference for each reaction to free-riding as a function of type of display (the reactions that are not displayed were never
chosen by participants).
between participants ANOVA. Results reveal a main effect of type
of display, F(2, 492)= 3.66, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.015. Post hoc test
using Bonferroni corrections reveal that people intended to reduce
their energy usage more during the following month when engag-
ing with an average display (M use= 2.45, SD= 0.65) than with the
two other types of display: anonymous (M use= 2.60, SD= 0.58)
and named (M use= 2.62, SD= 0.57). Scenario type had no main
or interaction effect on subsequent energy use intentions: the aver-
age display resulted in greater intentions to reduce energy use than
other types of display in both free-riding and control scenarios.
MEDIATION OF EMOTIONAL REACTIONS
We further investigated the processes underlying the effects of free-
riding and of type of display on how much energy people want to
use the following month and whether these effects only occurred in
a free-riding situation (moderation by situation). Specifically, we
investigated the role of emotional responses in the situation. To do
this, we combined moderation and mediation analyses. Mediation
analyses posit how independent variables (free-riding and energy
displays) affect a dependent variable (energy use) through one
or more potential intervening variables, or mediators (emotional
responses), and multiple mediation is the simultaneous mediation
by multiple variables. Moderation analysis focuses on factors that
affect the strength or direction of the relation between the indepen-
dent and dependent variables (Muller et al., 2005). We conducted a
multiple moderated mediation analysis using the product of coef-
ficient method recommended by Hayes (2013), with the type of
energy display (average, anonymous, or named) as an independent
variable, situation (free-riding vs. control) as a moderating vari-
able, energy use as the dependent variable, and feelings of guilt and
fear as mediators, see Figure 5. The situation variable was coded
as follows: 0.5 when there was a free-rider and−0.5 in the control
condition. The display variable was coded as follows: the average
display −0.5, the anonymized display 0, and the named display
0.5. The mediating variables, fear and guilt, were mean centered.
We have already showed that display and situation affected feel-
ings of fear and guilt, so that people felt more fear and guilt
when they saw the average display. This analysis reveals that
guilt, B=−0.11, t (496)=−3.55, p< 0.01 and fear, B=−0.08,
t (496)=−2.32, p< 0.05 mediate the effects of the displays on
energy use intention, R2= 0.06, F(3, 494)= 9.98, p< 0.001 for
the indirect effects. The residual effect of displays on energy
use is non-significant, B= 0.12, t (496)= 1.88, p= 0.06. The
effect of the type of display on emotions of fear and guilt is
moderated by the situation: details on the display reduce fear
and guilt more when there is a free-rider than in the control
condition, B=−0.93, t (494)=−3.07, p< 0.01 and B=−0.55,
t (494)=−2.81, p< 0.01, respectively for the interaction effects
on fear and guilt. So overall, the mediation effect is moderated
by the situation, so that the effects of energy display on energy
use are more strongly mediated by negative feelings of fear and
guilt when there is a free-rider, B= 0.03 (CI0.95= 0.005–0.09) and
B= 0.05 (CI0.95= 0.02–0.11), respectively for fear and guilt, than
in the control condition, B=−0.005 (CI0.95=−0.02–0.004) ns,
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FIGURE 5 | Direct and indirect effects of the type of display on energy
use intention the following month. Unstandardized coefficients are
presented. Displays were coded as: average=−0.5, anonymized=0, and
named=0.5. Situation was coded as: free-rider= 0.5 and control=−0.5.
a1 and a2 represent the effects of the type of display on emotions when
there is a free-rider, a′1 and a
′
2, its effects in the control condition. b1 and b2
represent the direct effects of emotions on the amount of energy people
want to use the following month, and c and c′, respectively the direct
effects and residual effects of the type of display on energy use intention
the following month. *p<0.05, **p<0.01.
and B=−0.007 (CI0.95=−0.05–0.03) ns, respectively for fear and
guilt (see Figure 5). This pattern of results show that the type of
energy display affected intentions of energy use through its effects
on emotional responses: it is through increased feelings of guilt
and fear that the average display encouraged people to decrease
their intention to use energy the following month (more than
with other types of display). It also shows that this indirect effect
is more important when there is a free-rider than when there is no
free-rider.
DISCUSSION
Our research is one of few studies that systematically compare how
different kinds of energy information on monitors may affect users
and energy behavior intentions. This research is also the first of
its kind (to our knowledge) to consider the ways that individuals
interact around energy as a shared resource. Furthermore, the role
of emotional reactions in this context and their effects on decision
making had not been investigated until now. We find that the way
people intend to use energy depends critically on how they think
others use energy, which is in line with research on social norms
(Cialdini et al., 1991; Cialdini, 2003) highlighting the importance
of social context in energy use. More specifically, our research
shows that in a shared energy situation, a typical energy display
(which displays overall energy usage) seems to lead to the greatest
reductions in energy use intentions due to emotional reactions of
fear and guilt of overusing energy, in comparison to displays that
give more detail of energy use.
We explored free-riding, where people use more than their fair
share of energy, as a common everyday scenario, and found that the
type of display had a significant effect on how people responded
to the same situations – when one of their household members
is found to use more energy than was agreed previously and was
used by the others. With average displays that did not identify
who overused energy, participants were more likely to choose
non-punishing reactions, such as checking that appliances were
switched off and asking others to do the same. With displays that
provided more information about the free-rider, people were more
likely to choose sanctions that were directed at an individual, such
as asking the individual who had overused to pay more for their
electricity use.
The information on the display also influenced emotional
responses and subsequent intentions to use energy. The less infor-
mation participants had from the energy display, the guiltier and
the more fearful they felt when too much energy had been used.
Conversely, the more information that people received from the
display and the more, they could identify who had used too much
energy, the angrier they felt when too much energy had been used.
Interestingly, no matter whether someone had used more than
their fair share of energy or not, less informative (average) dis-
plays were more likely to result in participants suggesting that they
would subsequently reduce their energy use. This response was
driven by feelings of fear and guilt. However, more informative
displays did mean that participants were more likely to identify
and sanction others who were overusing.
DISPLAY AND ENERGY USE
Our data indicate key differences in the way that people react to
different energy information both in standard energy sharing sit-
uations and in free-riding scenarios. With common displays that
provide an overall energy reading (and possibly historical reading)
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and do not allow determining where energy has been overused,
people tend to indicate that they will subsequently use less energy
than those people who view more detailed displays. Although pre-
vious research has indicated that some form of cooperation has
been observed in situations of anonymity (Schuessler, 1989; Fehr
and Gächter, 2002), generally cooperation in such situations was
lower than in situations where participants could be identified
(Andreoni and Petrie,2004; Rege and Telle,2004). Here,we observe
the opposite: we find that displays with less information (average)
tend to increase cooperation intentions. The mediation analyses
reveal that this effect is due to emotional responses of fear and guilt.
The less information participants have about energy users’ identity,
the more guilty, and fearful, they feel. Subsequently, people intend
to use energy according to these emotional reactions: the more
guilty and fearful they feel, the more they intend to reduce their
energy use. So, whereas previous research showed that anonymity
would reduce cooperation, here anonymity, because it increases
people’s fear and guilt, encourages cooperation (i.e., reduction
of energy use). These findings are in line with previous research
that finds that guilt increases cooperation, particularly for pro-self
oriented people (Ketelaar and Au, 2003; de Hooge et al., 2007;
Nelissen et al., 2007). However, our findings are at odds with pre-
vious research showing that fear decreases cooperation (Nelissen
et al., 2007). We propose that differences may arise with respect to
what feelings of fear relate to. In previous studies, fear and guilt
were directly manipulated, and it is unclear how they were inter-
preted by the participants. In the current study, we also did not
examine what our participants felt afraid of. Fear may therefore
have differing effects depending on what it is related to. For exam-
ple, in our study, people might feel fear being considered as the
free-rider or not having enough money to pay the bill, so they
decide to cooperate and intend to reduce their energy use in the
future. In previous studies, they may have been afraid of other
people not cooperating, and hence, decide to not cooperate them-
selves. In addition, fear may interact with some other aspect of
the study to determine behavioral effects. Indeed, it has previously
been noted that fear interacts with perceived control over behavior,
so that when people feel empowered to take action, fear is more
effective in promoting that action (Witte and Allen, 2000). Clearly,
the relationship between fear and cooperation is more complex
than previously thought and should be examined in more depth
in future research.
It is still to be established why people feel more guilt and
fear when presented with an average display compared to more
detailed displays in a free-riding scenario. One explanation is that
they think that other people in the house might suspect them to
be the person who has been free-riding. Another explanation is
that they think that they may really have been the person who
was free-riding and did use more than their fair share of energy.
Without any information or proof on each person’s use, there is
uncertainty over everyone’s use, as well as their own. It is also
possible that participants felt empathy for the free-rider and as
consequence of expecting the free-rider to feel fear and guilt; it
increased their own feelings of guilt and fear. These possibilities
are in line with Rawls’ theory of justice where people are put in a
“veil of ignorance”(Rawls, 1971). According to his theory, if people
know nothing about their position or abilities in a group or society,
they will make their decision from the perspective of all members
(the worst-off as well as the best-off). Here, participants presented
with an average display might decide to reduce their energy use
because it would be the best option for everyone, whatever their
actual energy use is or was the previous month, if the common
goal is to keep the bill under a certain amount. In such a context,
the “veil of ignorance” would then encourage actual communal
sharing as a model in the group, rather than “equality matching”
where people keep track of imbalances and act accordingly (Fiske,
1992).
PREFERRED SANCTIONS ON ENERGY OVERUSE
Our research is the first to test the hypotheses of altruistic pun-
ishment in the context of energy use. Common reactions to free-
riding in an energy situation here were to confront the person
who was overusing and ask them to pay more. This supports pre-
vious psychological research on altruistic punishment that finds
that people will punish free-riders, even at a high cost (discomfort)
to themselves (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr and
Rockenbach,2003; Balliet et al.,2011). However, the most common
potential reaction choice in a free-riding situation was to organize
a house meeting and discuss the problem. This is consistent with
experimental work showing that people prefer centralized over
individualized punishment regimens (Gürerk et al., 2006; Baldas-
sarri and Grossman, 2011; Traulsen et al., 2012). Note that, it is
possible that this reaction was, in part due to the characteristics of
the population sample examined; our participants were all univer-
sity staff and postgraduates and therefore, might be slightly more
moderate than the general UK population (Zipp and Fenwick,
2006).
The information that a participant viewed on the display also
had a significant impact on their anger and their preferred sanction
for a free-rider. Given that anonymous and named displays pro-
vided more information about where energy was being overused,
it is perhaps unsurprising that in these scenarios, participants were
angrier and more likely to directly ask the individual to pay more.
This shows that people are likely to use this strategy where pos-
sible, however, that the additional information provided by more
detailed displays may be useful in enabling this preferred strategy.
We also note, however, that the increased visibility of energy use
provided by more detailed displays may help to increase coopera-
tive behavior by reducing the likelihood of free-riding in the first
place (Haley and Fessler, 2005).
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Our findings have important implications for the ongoing rollout
of smart meters and associated displays across western countries,
for other energy sharing situations, e.g., virtual power plants, and
for the continuing development of energy monitoring technolo-
gies. Indeed, average energy displays (that display overall energy
use) are currently being rolled out in the UK and in many other
western countries, so it is important to compare the utility of
these with more detailed energy displays that are becoming avail-
able. Our research indicates that average displays actually appear
to encourage people to reduce their energy use more than more
detailed displays. However, in situations where energy use is
unequal or unfair, i.e., when somebody is free-riding, they may also
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increase potentially negative emotions such as fear and guilt that
could have detrimental effects on further interactions. Detailed
displays may be less useful in encouraging personal behavior
change but may be more useful in monitoring others’ behavior. We
note that more detailed displays provoke the negative emotion of
anger that also could be detrimental for further interactions. View-
ing more detailed displays also means that people are more likely
to intend to take direct actions and want to ask others who overuse
energy to pay more. This can be a powerful way of reducing overall
energy usage. Increased visibility may also be an effective tool in
instigating initial cooperative actions and maintaining a reduced
energy usage (Haley and Fessler, 2005). We propose that research
that considers repeated social interactions of the kind studied
here will be useful in further considering behavioral responses
to energy displays implemented. Our results suggest that detailed
information on displays may be less useful in encouraging per-
sonal behavior change in this context; however, it is possible that
more detailed displays are more helpful for occasional reference
or at a managerial level in business use than for a mass audience
for everyday use. This idea is also supported by the fact that more
detailed displays facilitate direct sanctions intentions, though, it
is important also to consider preferences for whether sanctions
should be imposed informally or by an external agent. This should
be investigated in further research where context (e.g., residential,
workplace) is also explored in more depth.
LIMITATIONS
Our study used hypothetical scenarios of energy sharing instead
of real life situations of energy use in a group (e.g., in a house or in
the workplace). This type of design, while allowing us to control
for interfering factors (e.g., the number of free-riders, or the extent
to which people sharing the energy know each other) limits the
extent to which, we can generalize our results. Most importantly,
in real life, people might be more motivated to save energy and
costs than in a scenario. Also, in reality, it is still difficult to mea-
sure accurately individual energy use: energy use per appliance is
becoming more common, but a part of energy can be used “as a
group” (e.g., heating in a common room). Furthermore, we used
self-reports of behavior preferences and intentions rather than
actual sanction reactions or energy use, and these are not always
well aligned with actual behavior (Paulhus and John, 1998; John
and Benet-Martinez, 2000). In particular, energy use is difficult
to monitor and to control for individuals, so intentions to reduce
energy may diverge somewhat from actual energy use. We also note
that sanctions and negative emotions can be particularly affected
by impression management and self-deceptive enhancement, as
people may be reluctant to admit to certain actions, particularly
gossiping or ostracizing. An interesting further study would be
to ask participants in the laboratory to share a real amount of
energy, and to look at real reactions to a confederate free-riding
or to explore sharing behavior in a real energy situation with
energy feedback provided. Finally, we note that while we used
a large sample of participants, this sample was not nationally rep-
resentative of the UK population. Our sample was drawn from a
sample of university staff and postgraduates students and there-
fore may have distinct characteristics, e.g., more liberal in views,
which could have influenced their reactions in the scenarios. In
addition, respondents may be more cooperative than others, given
that they were willing to help with this research. However, given
that sample characteristics were constant between different sce-
narios and conditions, these could not account for the differences
we found between groups.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, we find that different information on energy dis-
plays provoke significantly different responses from people that
must be taken into account when implementing energy mon-
itoring technologies. Average displays appear to result in most
people reducing their personal energy use and therefore may be the
most useful design for a mass rollout in shared spaces. However,
research has shown that cooperation was increased particularly
where regulation and sanctions were available to ensure and reas-
sure participants of mutually beneficial behavior (Alexander and
Christia, 2011). Hence, more detailed displays that are more use-
ful in implementing sanctions, may be more useful for occasional
and managerial consultation. We find that social interactions
around energy are important in determining personal reactions
and energy use and therefore further research in this field should
consider the social context around energy displays.
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